“LIUNA union officers and employees at all levels, including the general presidency, have been chosen, subject to the approval of, and have been controlled by, various members and associates of organized crime. Four consecutive General Presidents of LIUNA, Joseph V. Moreschi (1926-1968), Peter Fosco (1968-1975), Angelo Fosco (1975-1993) and Arthur Armand Coia (1993-present), have associated with, and been controlled and influenced by, organized crime figures. Consequently, the rights of the members of the union to control the affairs of the union have been systematically abused. Those union members who opposed this corrupt state of affairs, either at the local, district council, regional or international levels, have been intimidated into silence by violence, threats or violence, economic coercion, and by the known ties of corrupt local, district, regional, and international officials of the union with organized crime.”

The key to any RICO complaint is defendants face treble damages if the plaintiff proves the defendant engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Since RICO is a civil action the burden of proof is just the “preponderance of the evidence,” not the criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” thus making it far easier for the plaintiff to prevail.
 
1.2 Operating Agreement and Impending Consent Decree
On February 15, 1995 LIUNA and DOJ entered into the controversial Operating Agreement.  This Agreement was unprecedented because it allowed the corrupt union not only to escape the draft RICO complaint, but it also allowed LIUNA to avert a “government takeover.”  Unlike DOJ’s reform efforts with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in 1989, no court-approved Consent Decree was imposed on LIUNA.  Rather than DOJ and a U.S. District Court “cleaning up” the union, LIUNA would clean up itself. Thus, the LIUNA “internal reform effort” was created.

This “sweetheart deal” required LIUNA to establish the infrastructure of an “internal reform effort” for the purpose of “investigating and disciplining individuals within any entity of LIUNA for wrongful association with, or corruption by, members of organized crime, as well as instituting other reforms.”

The one sliver of power the Agreement gave to DOJ was LIUNA’s unconditional consent to a “government takeover” for any reason.  Specifically, if “the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division [James K. Robinson] determines, in [his] sole discretion, that...[it] is necessary and desirable,” he may impose a previously agreed upon Consent Decree.  Thus, for any reason, DOJ could impose the Consent Decree without further court or union approval.  The impending Consent Decree would effectively end the current “internal reform effort” by placing court-appointed officials in charge of investigations, elections and hearings.  Although the “internal reform effort” mimics many of the Consent Decree’s measures, the overriding difference is that the Consent Decree would be backed with the power and integrity of a U.S. District Court and federal law enforcement agencies; whereas, the “internal reform effort” relies on the good-faith efforts of its officers and LIUNA’s General Executive Board (GEB) led by Coia.

1.3 “Internal Reform Effort” Infrastructure and Taxpayer Savings Myth
After the Agreement was signed in 1995, LIUNA had 90 days to create its “internal reform effort.”  Four main officers emerged:

(1) GEB Attorney: sometimes called the in-house prosecutor, is responsible for investigating and removing corrupt individuals from LIUNA.  Robert D. Luskin, a prominent Washington criminal defense attorney, was selected as the GEB Attorney by the GEB and Coia. The impending Consent Decree also calls for a similar, but more powerful, GEB Attorney. Further, under the Consent Decree the GEB Attorney could be removed and the office terminated for failure to make “sufficient progress.”

(2) Inspector General: similar to IGs in federal agencies, this office is a clearinghouse for allegations of wrongdoing.  The IG works on investigations with the GEB Attorney, but also monitors compliance with LIUNA’s “Ethical Practice Code.”  W. Douglas Gow, a former FBI official, was selected as IG by the GEB and Coia.  The impending Consent Decree calls for a similar, but more powerful, Investigations Officer. Under the Consent Decree, however, the Investigations Officer would be appointed by a U.S. District Court.

(3) Hearing Officer: is an internal judge who hears cases brought by the GEB Attorney and has the power, in theory, to eject corrupt individuals from LIUNA.  Peter F. Viara, a former U.S. Attorney, was selected as the Hearings Officer by the GEB and Coia. The impending Consent Decree calls for a similar, but more powerful, Independent Monitor. Under the Consent Decree, however, the Independent Monitor would be appointed by a U.S. District Court.

(4) Appellate Officer: hears any appeals of the Hearings Officer’s decisions.  W. Neil Eggleston, former Clinton White House attorney and Bill Clinton’s attorney for his executive privilege cases, was selected as the Hearings Officer by the GEB and Coia. The impending Consent Decree has no provision for an Appellate Officer; instead all appeals of the Independent Monitor’s decisions would be heard by a U.S. District Judge.

According to Luskin, the “internal reform effort” has cost LIUNA about $35 million since 1995.  Many advocates of the “internal reform effort,” in LIUNA and DOJ, have continually reinforced the myth that the “internal reform efforts” saves taxpayer funds because the union, and not the government, is financing the clean-up.  There are two flaws in this argument. First, just because it’s cheap does not mean it’s good.  If DOJ has to spend millions more to clean-up LIUNA in 2005-2010 because the “internal reform effort” fails, there is no taxpayer savings.

Second and more importantly, paragraph 52 of the impending Consent Decree clearly  states: “[t]he compensation and expenses of the GEB Attorney, Independent Monitor, Investigations Officer and the Election Officer, and of all person hired under their authority,  shall be paid by LIUNA.” It also requires LIUNA to maintain a $150,000 balance to keep the Consent Decree’s operation solvent. Further, it requires full and itemized disclosure of all expenditures. Thus, the increase in cost, if any, to taxpayers for the imposition of the consent decree would be minimal and at the same time accountability would increase.

1.4 Shortcomings of the 1999-2000 Extension
On January 8, 1999 DOJ announced the second one-year extension of the Operating Agreement, which was originally due to end February 11, 1998.  The first extension from February 1998 to January 1999 did not alter the original Agreement.  However, in the latest extension, which ends January 31, 2000, DOJ disturbingly capitulated on two issues:

(1) DOJ must now allow the “internal reform effort” to curtail its efforts to accommodate LIUNA’s “budgetary constraints” and “need to maintain other programs and services.”  Thus allowing the GEB to limit the resources of the “internal reform effort,” which many LIUNA dissidents claim is under-funded and under-staffed already.

(2) DOJ can no longer impose the Consent Decree if it believes it is “necessary and desirable” to do so.  Now the Consent Decree can only be imposed if DOJ “reasonably concludes that the failure to [do so] would substantially interfere with accomplishing the purposes of the Agreement,” thus making the imposition of the Consent Decree more complicated and remote.

1.5 Purpose of this Report
This report is meant to be a tool for DOJ, union dissidents, the news media and all who want LIUNA cleaned of corruption and corrupt leaders.  As mentioned above and detailed below, LIUNA’s so-called “internal reform effort” is at best a failure and at worst a sham.  It is neither INDEPENDENT nor as EFFECTIVE as the imposition of the Consent Decree -- backed with court-appointed officials and not GEB-selected officers -- would be.  The purpose of this report is to encourage 1) the imposition of the Consent Decree without further delay, 2) the removal of General President Arthur A. Coia and 3) the replacement of Robert D. Luskin as GEB Attorney.

This report is by no means comprehensive. As more examples justifying the need for the imposition of the Consent Decree are uncovered, this report will be electronically expanded.  Therefore, please visit www.nlpc.org regularly for important updates to this report.

2. LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
2.1 Coia’s Advocate Becomes Coia’s Prosecutor
From November 1994 to February 1995, criminal defense attorney Robert D. Luskin was retained by LIUNA to lead settlement negotiations of the draft RICO complaint with the goal of limiting DOJ’s involvement and keeping whatever reform effort emerged within the shelter of LIUNA.  Luskin is credited with dreaming up what he calls this “imaginative approach” to union corruption.  In February 1995, Luskin switched sides.  Luskin went from LIUNA and Arthur A. Coia’s advocate to their prosecutor under “internal reform effort.”  It was as if Johnny Cochrane was allowed to take over Marsha Clark’s job and prosecute O.J. Simpson in a quasi-judicial system funded and controlled by O.J. Simpson.

Luskin was able to pull off the switch because DOJ trusted him and put a lot of stock in Luskin’s past, yet very brief, stint as a DOJ attorney from 1980-82.  Further, Luskin was  allowed to lead the “internal reform effort” because Coia and a majority of the GEB trusted him.  How these two opposing groups came to mutually trust Luskin is suspicious and led to many critics’ broader suspicions of the how Coia was able to get this “sweetheart deal” out of DOJ.  This gave rise to several well-documented articles connecting allegations of misconduct between Coia, Bill Clinton and the Clinton DOJ. See: Eugene H. Methvin, “The Clintons and the Union Boss,” Reader’s Digest Apr. 1996; John E. Mulligan and Dean Starkman, “An F.O.B. and the Mob,” Washington Monthly May 1996; and Byron York, “Mob Rules: Bill and Arthur’s Beautiful Friendship,” American Spectator Apr. 1997.

The key here is that Luskin is not truly independent as the DOJ hopes.  How can Luskin go from being Coia’s virtual defense attorney trying to stave off a government takeover and save Coia’s job to a vigorous prosecutor trying bring to Coia to justice?  It defies common sense.  Luskin did bring charges against Coia in November 1997 -- nearly three years after he took over the “internal reform effort” -- allegedly for pre-1993 corruption.  However, to date, the exact charges have not been disclosed and the result of the internal quasi-trial have not been revealed.  Further, critics will be astonished if Coia receives a true punishment.  It is anticipated that Coia will keep his plush post with, if anything, a minor slap on the wrist or he will be cordially asked to leave the union will a platinum parachute in tow.

2.2 Luskin’s Ties to the New England/Patriarca Crime Family
Robert D. Luskin is no stranger to organized crime figures in Providence, Rhode Island, the home of Arthur A. Coia.  Stephen A. Saccoccia was a client of Luskin. Saccoccia was a Rhode Island precious metals dealer convicted of money-laundering for the two South American drug cartels and La Cosa Nostra crime families in New England.  He was sentenced in 1993 to 660 years in federal prison, fined $15.8 million and ordered to forfeit all laundered money.  Former U.S. Customs Commissioner Carol B. Hallett identified Saccoccia as “an associate” of the Raymond L.S. Patriarca crime family in Rhode Island and also as “a contract employee for the LCN.” Further in 1985, Saccoccia pled guilty to tax evasion in connection to his role as a key moneymaking “associate” for the Patriarca crime family and spent a brief time in jail. See: Timothy J. Burger, “DOJ Targeting Attorneys’ Fees,” The Recorder Feb. 11, 1998; and Jonathan D. Rockoff, “U.S., Lawyer Settle Suit Over Fee,” Providence Journal-Bulletin May 10, 1998.

On May 8, 1998, Luskin agreed to forfeit to the federal government $245,000 of $674,296 he received in “legal fees” from Saccoccia.  Luskin said he received 45 gold bars valued at $505,125 and $169,171 in wire transfers from a Swiss bank account.  DOJ, led by then-U.S. Attorney Sheldon Whitehouse, went after Luskin and four other Saccoccia attorneys for the money paid to them out of profits laundered by Saccoccia.  The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that attorneys cannot be paid with funds acquired as result of the crime.  Whitehouse charged Luskin with “willful blindness” in accepting the gold bars and wired funds -- after all, Whitehouse noted, Saccoccia’s crimes involved precious metals, including gold, and Swiss bank accounts.  Whitehouse further stated, “Luskin had reasonable cause to know that these funds were the proceeds of Saccoccia’s money-laundering activities.  Luskin, however, chose not to know the true origin of these funds.”

The first issue against Luskin is his character. DOJ does not take such an action lightly. U.S. attorneys must check with DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section and the Criminal Division before seeking such forfeitures. Gerald McDowell, head of DOJ’s asset forfeiture section, said it was very rare for DOJ to seize attorneys’ fees saying it occurs maybe two or three times a year.  Should someone who DOJ believes wrongfully and willfully took attorney fees from organized crime’s profits (apparently including profits from LCN) be trusted at the same time by the same DOJ to root-out organized crime (including LCN) from one of America’s most corrupt unions?  The DOJ’s answer should be “No.”  Luskin, who de facto admitted that his acceptance of funds from Saccoccia was wrong with his settlement, should not be trusted by DOJ to continue the LIUNA “internal reform effort.”

The second and more important issue is the inherent conflict of interest regarding the relationships of Luskin, Saccoccia, the Patriarca crime family and Coia.  Coia is no stranger to the Patriarcas.  DOJ’s draft RICO complaint stated that “The New England or Patriarca family...is headquartered in the areas of both Boston, Massachusetts and Providence, Rhode Island and operates there and in various other locations. The New England family is [connected to] the Genovese family.”  The draft RICO complaint, which named Coia as a defendant, also identified the late Raymond L.S. Patriarca as a co-conspirator.  In 1981, Coia was indicted for bribery and racketeering along with his father, the late Arthur E. Coia, and Patriarca. The charges were later dropped on a technicality.

In addition to the obvious and direct connection of Luskin-Saccoccia-Patriarca-Coia, other questions exist.  The former Rhode Island bank, Heritage Loan and Investment Company, was the only financial institution to have reportedly aided in Saccoccia’s money-laundering schemes.  Heritage Loan and Investment was the home of the North American Laborers Defense League which solicited funds to aid LIUNA officials, including Coia, with legal defense expenses.  This same bank figured prominently in the 1990-91 collapse of Rhode Island’s banking system.

Further, Luskin’s services for Saccoccia raise questions. Luskin did not represent Saccoccia at trial.  He reportedly helped on sentencing and appeals as well as with frozen assets around the world.  For this he received almost $700,000?  According to Whitehouse, the $169,171 in wire transfers from Switzerland were made between December 4, 1994 and February 23, 1995.  November 4, 1994 was the day DOJ delivered the draft RICO complaint to LIUNA.  The controversial Operation Agreement by which LIUNA averted a Government takeover and Coia saved his job, was signed on February 13, 1995.  It was during this period that Coia hired Luskin to negotiate LIUNA’s case with DOJ.  The confluence of these dates, this money and these individuals at the very least should raise serious questions about Luskin and the trust DOJ has placed in him to run the “internal reform effort.”

Saccoccia and his connections to the Patriarca crime family and possibly to Coia, make Luskin a walking conflict of interest.  Between the Patriarca crime family, Coia and Luskin, the opportunities for improper influence and tampering with the “internal reform effort” are endless. It is as if Luskin was charged with overseeing a corrupt organization’s reform effort and at the same time receiving payment from the corrupt entities of the organization in order to go easy on the organization and its leaders.  Without an oversight offical who is, and is perceived to be, totally and unquestionably independent, the reform effort is a joke.  Luskin has an obligation under the Agreement to perform his duties with the utmost integrity and independence.  But, his financial ties to Saccoccia and possibly to LCN and the Patriarca crime family, render him incapable of performing his duties under the Agreement.

2.3 Luskin’s Ties, via Middleton, to the Clinton Campaign Finance Scandal
In light of the troubled nexus between Arthur A. Coia and Bill Clinton as detailed by Eugene Methvin, John Mulligan and Byron York (cited above), Robert D. Luskin’s representation of Mark E. Middleton, at reduced rates, furthers the argument that Luskin and the ”internal reform effort “ is not independent.

Middleton is a close friend of Bill Clinton.  Middleton came to Washington from Arkansas, worked in former White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty’s office as an aide to Clinton, and has been entangled in the Clinton fundraising scandals with the likes of John Huang, the Riady family and others.  Middleton met with representatives of North China Power Group and Lippo Group in the White House on April 22, 1994. Allegedly, John Huang had a role in arranging the meeting as part of a larger campaign fundraising effort.  After leaving the White House, he traveled with Charlie Trie to Taiwan in an effort to allegedly raise campaign funds, and he reportedly passed out business cards stating he was a special assistant to the President in order to gain influence. He invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid Congressional investigators last year. See also: Eliza Newlin Carney and Peter H. Stone, “Blind Ambition,” National Journal Jun. 7, 1997.

In addition to Middleton, Luskin and his Washington criminal defense law firm, Comey, Boyd and Luskin, also represents/represented lesser Clinton scandal figures: 1) former DOJ official Philip B. Heymann when he testified before Congress on Whitewater; 2) Joel I. Klein -- now in DOJ's antitrust division but then a deputy White House counsel -- when he was queried about Whitewater documents. 3) an unnamed client in the independent counsel probe of former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy; and 4) Linda Medlar, the former mistress of former housing secretary Henry Cisneros. See: Harvey Berkman, “Scandals Give Him the Business,” National Law Journal Feb. 17, 1997.

There would be no problem with Luskin representing Middleton and these other Clinton friends who are involved in Clinton scandals, if Luskin was not already investigating another Clinton friends for ties to organized crime, namely Coia. It is as if Mr. Luskin was charged with overseeing a corrupt organization’s “reform effort” and at the same time serving as defense counsel to political allies of that corrupt organization.  Between Clinton, Coia and Luskin, the opportunities for improper influence and tampering with the “internal reform effort” are endless.  Here is just one possibility: the Clinton Administration could tell Luskin go easy on Coia or else undesirable and harmful information on Luskin’s client, Middleton, will be released.

Even more troubling is the fact that Luskin has admitted, in the Washington Post, to charging Middleton a reduced rate on his legal expenses. Could LIUNA and Coia’s lavish legal fees paid to Luskin, about $91,000 a month (See section 2.6), be paying for more than the “internal reform effort?”  Could Coia returning a favor to his “poor” friend Clinton by subsidizing Middleton’s legal bills in order to keep Middleton quiet?  There is no smoking gun yet, but the fact that such questions could be posed about Luskin is troubling enough for DOJ to doubt his independence in overseeing Coia and the “internal reform effort.”

2.4 Luskin’s Attacks of Starr, Defense of Clinton
In light of the troubled nexus between Arthur A. Coia and Bill Clinton as detailed by Eugene Methvin, John Mulligan and Byron York (cited above), Robert D. Luskin’s repeated attacks on Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr and defense of Bill Clinton in the news media furthers the argument that Luskin and the ”internal reform effort “ is not independent.

In 18 newspaper articles and 12 television appearances, Luskin has defended Clinton and/or attacked Starr.  Here are four illustrative newspaper examples:
 

(1) “While the federal perjury statute applies to private lawsuits, prosecutors rarely bring such cases to court, generally leaving it to litigants and judges to sort out who is lying and take appropriate action. ‘If I’m the prosecutor that case is brought to, I would decline the case because it seems to me that you ought not to be indicting the president of the United States for things that you don't indict Joe Six- Pack for,’ said criminal defense lawyer Robert Luskin.” Ruth Marcus, “Allegations Against Clinton Could Lead To Impeachment, Prosecution,” Wash. Post Jan. 22, 1998.

(2) “Robert Luskin, a former federal prosecutor who is a defense attorney in Washington, said Starr's inquiry has gone out of bounds. ‘These are incredibly intrusive tactics that tend to be reserved by prosecutors for the most serious cases involving the most serious offenses,’ Luskin said. ‘In real life, you would never see a prosecutor using these tactics to pursue these kinds of allegations, even if he decided to investigate the case.’” John Henry, “Has Starr gone too far?” Houston Chronicle Feb. 15, 1998.

(3) “At the same time, legal experts said it was difficult to imagine Starr bringing a federal obstruction of justice case against Clinton or his partisans for what appears to be an exercise of their First Amendment rights. ‘I’m stupefied,’ said criminal defense lawyer Robert Luskin, a former federal prosecutor. ‘What incredible bad judgment.  I don’t think you use the grand jury authority to harass people who are criticizing you. ...If the idea is that somehow you can’t accuse the prosecutor of being an unscrupulous dog without trying to obstruct justice, that’s crazy.’” Ruth Marcus, “Legal Battle in Clinton Probe Getting ‘Much Too Personal,’” Wash. Post Feb. 25, 1998.

(4) “Although [perjury] applies to civil as well as criminal cases, prosecutions are rarely brought for obstructing a civil case, like Ms. Jones's. "I've never tried a civil case where someone wasn't lying about something," said Robert D. Luskin, a trial lawyer here, "but you don't say, 'I'm going to call in a U.S. attorney now.' " David E. Rosenbaum, “The Three Little Words That Becloud a Presidency,” N.Y. Times Aug. 13, 1998.

(5) Ruth Marcus, “As Ginsburg Broadcasts, Colleagues Air Their Disbelief,” Wash. Post   Feb. 2, 1998.
(6) Brian McGrory, “Clinton Prosecutors Enter Pivotal Stage of Investigation,” Boston    Globe Feb. 4, 1998.
(7) Laurie Asseo, “Controversy Fuels Career of TV Lawyers,” A.P. Feb. 5, 1998.
(8) Brian McGrory, “Lewinsky Lawyer Tells Altered Tale,” Boston Globe Mar. 6, 1998.
(9) Peter Baker, “Starr Vows Vigorous Pursuit Despite Jones Suit Dismissal,” Wash. Post   Apr. 3, 1998.
(10) William Safire, “The Return of Joe Six-Pack,” N.Y. Times May 3, 1998.
(11) Brian McGrory, “Lewinsky Seeks Credibility Boost,” Boston Globe Jun. 11, 1998.
(12) Larry Margasak, “Report Denies Clinton Asked for Lies,” A.P. Jul. 28, 1998.
(13) Brian McGrory, “Lewinsky Granted Wide Immunity,” Boston Globe Jul. 29, 1998.
(14) Brian Blomquist, “Bill Will Talk Sex, On Tape,” N.Y. Post Jul. 30, 1998.
(15) Ruth Marcus, “Clinton’s Fate May Ride on Tough-to-Prove Obstruction Case,”    Wash. Post Aug. 7, 1998.
(16) Louis Branson, “White House Silent on Monica Testimony,” Scotsman Aug. 8, 1998.
(17) Peter Stone, “More Headaches for Clinton and Gore?” Nat. Journal Aug. 22, 1998.
(18) Brian McGrory, “Starr’s Arsenal is All Innuendo, Clinton Backers Say,” Boston Globe   Oct. 14, 1998.

(1) “Burden of Proof,” CNN May 26, 1998.
[ROGER]COSSACK: Well, Bob, you're a criminal defense attorney...these allegations... they seem almost uncheckable.  If Jim McDougal was going to be called as a witness by the independent counsel, what kind of a witness would he have made?

ROBERT LUSKIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Well, I mean, I suppose the only thing less credible when the snitch is a dead snitch, so I suppose it would have been better in front of the independent counsel than he is now, but I suppose it depends upon the corroboration that [McDougal co-author] Curtis [Wilkie] says that he may or may not have. ...I don't think a prosecutor, in those circumstances, even if he believed that the witness was telling the truth, would bring a charge based on that.  If there is nothing there to corroborate, no one else to corroborate it, and a witness who has a track record like McDougal's, at the end of the day, even if you believe in your gut that it's true, you throw up your hands and say I can't go with this.”

(2) “Burden of Proof,” CNN Sep. 23, 1998.
COSSACK: Bob Luskin, we've heard reports that some of the Linda Tripp tapes may, and I say may, have been doctored, erased, gone over. As a defense, what import does that have?

ROBERT LUSKIN, FORMER FEDERAL PROSECUTOR: Well, it's got huge import. In the first place, obviously, it calls into question anything that is on the tape, it also obviously calls into question her personal credibility on any matters which she's testified to.  And, obviously, also it's a criminal offense, and can be charged that way, indeed it has been charged that way in the Cisneros independent counsel investigation, what was then their principle witness, Linda Medlar.

[GRETA] VAN SUSTEREN: But does it really have any bearing on the Ken Starr investigation as it relates to the president since my understanding...is that Linda Tripp was basically the gun to the head of Monica Lewinsky to cooperate.  That happened.  Now, Linda Tripp may have her own independent criminal problems that she doctored it, but isn't it irrelevant to the president's legal issues.

LUSKIN: I mean, I think you are right, Greta.  It is largely irrelevant.  It doesn't appear to me that Linda Tripp has ever had any personal knowledge about any of the matters that are truly at issue here.  It may be relevant insofar as some of the things that may have been said to her or through her are relevant to these allegations of obstruction of justice because she does play a role in those allegations.

(3) “Burden of Proof,” CNN Nov. 18, 1998.
VAN SUSTEREN: Bob, how do you prepare?  I mean, what does counsel for the president do to prepare, tonight, for a cross-examination of Ken Starr?

LUSKIN: Well, I mean, the first thing you do whenever you prepare a cross-examination is try and figure out what you can accomplish, particularly given the time constraints.  So, my assumption is that in 30 minutes what you can try and do, or at least if you have time, what you try to do in a cross-examination of Starr and his Report, first is to try and show that he relied completely on witnesses whose credibility should have been questioned if one were being impartial.

VAN SUSTEREN: Meaning who?

LUSKIN: Meaning -- let's start with Monica Lewinsky.  I mean, this is woman who came to this investigation having admitted that she was a perjurer, but it's clear that in every point where her testimony conflicts with that of others, Ken Starr accepted her testimony as credible. The second thing I think that you would try and accomplish is to show that the report ignored or buried directly exculpatory information, like the testimony of Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan. And I think the third thing that you would try and accomplish is to show that the more serious charges, the charges of obstruction, are really not supported by any evidence and that the allegations, really, the evidence, is really wholly circumstantial in nature.

(4) “Burden of Proof,” CNN Jan. 28, 1998.
(5) “Burden of Proof,” CNN Feb. 11, 1998.
(6) ”The Big Show,” MSNBC Feb. 16, 1998.
(7) ”The Big Show,” MSNBC Mar. 10, 1998.
(8) “The World Today,” CNN May 26, 1998.
(9) “Burden of Proof,” CNN Jun. 29, 1998.
(10) ”The Big Show,” MSNBC Jul. 1, 1998.
(11) “InterNight,” MSNBC Aug. 4, 1998.
(12) “InterNight,” MSNBC Sep. 7, 1998.

2.5 Luskin’s Other Questionable Legal Ties
In addition to the aforementioned concerns of Robert D. Luskin’s ties to Stephen A. Saccoccia, mob money-launderer, there several other Luskin clients that raise questions about his independence in the “internal reform effort.”

(1) Former-U.S. District Judge Robert P. Aguilar.  In 1987, federal agents were investigating health care fraud in Northern California and targeted an ex-Teamsters boss, Rudy Tham, and an organized crime boss, Abe Chapman.  The agents saw Aguilar leave the courthouse with Chapman, a family friend.  When a fellow judge heard about the incident from the agents, he told Aguilar that Aguilar’s name “had come up” on an application for a wiretap. Judges are obliged by law to keep such information confidential but Aguilar warned Chapen about the possibility of a wiretap.  The agents also learned that Chapman and Tham’s attorney met with Aguilar to discuss how they could influence another judge who was set to rule in a Tham case. Aguilar then approached the other judge. Later, when the agents interviewed Aguilar, he lied about both the wiretap and the Tham conversation.  Prosecutors brought an eight-count indictment against Aguilar, and a jury convicted Aguilar in 1990 on two counts: obstructing a grand jury inquiry and disclosing a wiretap.  See: David G. Savag, “Justices Reinstate Conviction of U.S. Judge in California,” L.A. Times Jun. 22, 1995. Luskin represented Aguilar on several appeals throughout the 1990s.

(2) Ronald “Ronnie” Lorenzo. In 1993, reputed mobster Lorenzo was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison in Los Angeles for drug trafficking. A federal jury convicted Lorenzo  of conspiracy and distribution of cocaine in two 1990 deals with FBI informant Robert Franchi.  Lorenzo reportedly trusted Franchi due to their mutual friends in Raymond L.S. Patriarca’s organized-crime family in New England.  Authorities believe Lorenzo is a member of the Bonnano crime family.  See: Paul Lieberman, “Inside Hollywood Mike’s Crew,” L.A. Times Apr. 14, 1996.  According to DOJ’s draft RICO complaint against LIUNA, “The Bonnano family...is headquartered in New York City and operates in various other locations in the United States. The Bonnano family is [a] New York City LCN family...” Luskin represented Lorenzo on an appeal that Lorenzo lost on Oct. 8, 1998.

(3) Peter Chong. Chong, a reputed leader of the Wo Hop To crime organization "triad" in San Francisco, is currently a fugitive.  Luskin represented Chong before the U.S. Senate Government Operations in November 1991 where Chong repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering questions about burgeoning Asian organized crime in California. At the hearing, Chong admitted that he was a citizen of the People's Republic of China.  Chong refused to state whether he was the head of the Wo Hop To gang or whether he was involved in the murder Danny Wong, reputed leader of the rival Wah Ching gang. See: “Reputed Asian Gang Chief Takes Fifth,” L.A. Times Nov. 6, 1991.

(4) Thanong “Thai Tony” Siriprechapong. Siriprechapong is Southeast Asia businessman and a former member of the Thai parliament.  Siriprechapong was indicted by a U.S. federal grand jury in 1991 for smuggling over 45 ton of hashish. Siriprechapong was the first citizen ever extradited by the the Thai government.  Luskin was working for Siriprechapong in Oct. 1998 to get the criminal charges dropped. See: Bill Wallace, “Customs Conviction Muddies Drug Trial,” S.F. Chronicle Nov. 9, 1998.

(5) Matthew A. Kilroe. Kilroe was one of seven Boston police officers convicted in 1988 on 56 counts of bribery, extortion and racketeering.  See: Elizabeth Neuffer, “New trial sought for 7 in police extortion case,” Boston Globe Dec. 7, 1989. Luskin was co-counsel on Kilroe’s appeal with Anthony M. Traini. Traini a lawyer who works closely and out of the offices that used to be Arthur A. Coia’s Providence law firm, Coia & Lepore. Coia’s relative, Raymond C. Coia, replaced Arthur A. Coia in 1996. Traini has done extensive legal work for LIUNA over the years including the “botched” pension investigation of Dominick Lopreato of Connecticut Laborers' District Council. Lopreato was later indicted and convicted in 1995 and Traini actually represented Lopreato after his indictment.  See: Dan Barry, “A Textbook Case of Union Corruption,” Providence Journal-Bulletin, Jun. 11, 1995; and Mark Pazniokas, “Labor Leader Enters Plea of Not Guilty,” Hartford Courant Oct. 1, 1994.

2.6 Luskin’s Financial Dependence on the GEB
Robert D. Luskin can never be truly independent when he is dependent on LIUNA General Executive Board, led by Arthur A. Coia, for funding.  Luskin’s reported compensation to date has been quite lavish.  He recently disclosed that the “internal reform effort” as a whole has cost LIUNA about $35 million since 1995.  But in June 1998, Luskin admitted to his take -- $4 million.  Luskin and his small law firm have received $4 million from November 1994 to June 1998 from LIUNA. See: Stephanie Mencimer, “Ex-FBI Official Pulls at Union’s Infamous Roots,” Washington Post Jun. 7, 1998.

$4 million over 44 months (Nov. 94 to Jun. 98) equals $90,909 a month, or...$1,090,909 a year... $20,979 a week... $4,196 a day...$524 a hour (at 40 hours a week)... $8.74 a minute... all thanks to the mandatory unions dues of LIUNA members. Bring that estimate up to date (51 months), it is now about $4.63 million. Remember too that LIUNA is not Luskin’s only client.

More troubling is the GEB’s recent willingness to yank on Luskin chain.  According to Reader’s Digest’s Eugene Methvin, the GEB defunded Luskin and the “internal reform effort” in the summer of 1998 claiming it cost to much.  Allegedly, DOJ pressure made the GEB restore the funding. However, as Methvin correctly points out, this episode demonstrates that 1) Luskin and the “internal reform effort” are not independent and 2) the GEB is hostile to cleaning up the union.  Undoubtedly, this was a major reason behind DOJ’s concession in the 1999-2000 Extension of the Operating Agreement to accommodate LIUNA’s “budgetary constraints.” (See section 1.4.)

2.7 Eggleston’s Conflicts
LIUNA’s Appellate Officer, W. Neil Eggleston, the person that hears all “internal reform effort appeals and makes final decisions on members’ and bosses’ fate, is also tainted by several glaring conflicts of interest.  Like Luskin, several Eggleston clients are wrapped up in this Adminstration’s scandals, but unlike Luskin one Eggleston client is Bill Clinton himself.  Eggleston is Clinton’s lead attorney for executive privilege matters.  Eggleston argued Clinton’s case for executive privilege before the Supreme Court in the summer of 1998. See: David Stout, “Clinton Lawyer Appeals Ruling on Privilege,” N.Y. Times Aug. 22, 1998.

Eggleston is also U.S. Labor Secretary Alexis H. Herman’s lead attorney for combating Herman’s independent counsel. Herman is in trouble over alleged illegal campaign contributions to the Democratic National Committee and seeking to benefit a company in which she had a financial interest while working at the White House.  See: Deborah Billings, “Independent Counsel Investigating Herman Plans to Act Quickly in Fairness to Secretary,” BNA: Daily Labor Report May 29, 1998.

Eggleston has three other connections to the Clinton Adminstration.  Eggleston served as Associate Counsel to the President from 1993-94.  Also according to testimony before the U.S. House Government  Reform and Oversight Committee on November 6-7, 1997, Cheryl D. Mills, Deputy Counsel to the President and Dimitri Nionakis, Associate Counsel to the President, were.are both clients of Eggleston.

Eggleston connections to the scandal-ridden Clinton Adminstration are troubling due to the nexus between Arthur A. Coia and Bill Clinton as detailed by Eugene Methvin, John Mulligan and Byron York (cited above). Eggleston’s representation of Clinton, Herman and the others, furthers the argument that the LIUNA ”internal reform effort “ is not independent.

3. LACK OF EFFECTIVENESS
Due to the incomplete disclosure of the “internal reform effort,” this section of the report is not yet fully developed.  NLPC hopes to be able to demonstrate that despite the claims of progress by LIUNA’s slick legal team the imposition of the impending Consent Decree by DOJ would be more effective than the current “internal reform effort.”  LIUNA dissidents and other interested parties with leads on the lack of effectiveness of the internal reform effort please email ideas to nlpc@nlpc.org.

Here are two recent examples of the lack of effectiveness of the “internal reform effort:” 

(1) Coia Under Investigation in Canada. The Financial Services Commission of Ontario, not LIUNA’s “internal reform effort,” opened a fraud investigation in late 1998 into the “finances and dealings” of the Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central & Eastern Canada. LIUNA president Arthur A. Coia is one of the Fund’s 5 trustees being probed. Coia is also the Fund’s chairman. Investigators are probing a tainted 1989 land deal that the Fund paid $23.7 million for a parcel of land that is now allegedly worth $5 million. But the Fund’s books value the property at $28 million. The property is in Stoney Creek, Ontario. There were purportedly plans to have condos built, but there has been no development on the land. The parcel is owned by a company that is wholly controlled by the Fund. Ontario law and LIUNA’s own conflict-of-interest rules stated that the Fund’s assets cannot be invested in a “corporation wholly owned or controlled either directly or indirectly” by any trustee. See: Jim Rankin, “Watchdog Probes Labourers’ Pension Fund,” Toronto Star Dec. 15, 1998.

(2) Government Orders New Election in Ohio. The U.S. Department of Labor, not LIUNA’s “internal reform effort,” ordered a new election at LIUNA Local 423 in Columbus because vice-president Pat Murphy’s felony conviction 14 years ago made him ineligible for union office. Murphy was also wrongfully elected to the local’s district council seat. Both elections will be rerun and monitored by DOL on Jan. 30. In 1984, Murphy was convicted of robbery and spent nearly 2 years in prison. The conviction meant Murphy was ineligible, under federal law, for union office until 1999. Opponents tried to make this point during the 1998 election, but a complaint by dissidents saying Murphy was a felon was rejected by LIUNA’s “internal hearing officer” Peter F. Vaira who is part of the failed “internal reform effort” team. Vaira suspiciously claims that his office was unable to substantiate the felony conviction. Thankfully for dissidents, DOL investigated and chose to exercise its authority to rule on union elections. See: Lornet Turnbull, “Feds Order Union Local to Hold New Vote for VP,” Columbus Dispatch Dec. 10, 1998.

Return to the index of this report.

Organized Labor Accountability Project